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not so much the fault of either editor or contributors as it is that of authors neglecting to send copies for review. Wherever and whenever it is possible, the editor and contributors have endeavored to do justice to all.

Beginning with Vol. 21, the section "Oriental Languages and Literatures, etc., " comprising Egyptology, Assyriology, Arabic and Ethiopic, Aramaic dialects, Phœnician, Semitic palæography and manuscripts, will be intrusted to a specialist along those lines, as was suggested in a former notice.⁵ We congratulate editor and contributors upon the work so well done in the past, and bid them good cheer, sympathy, and best wishes for a still better future. "Invaluable as a guide to the student at the present time, the importance of this compendium will be immeasurably enhanced in the days of future generations."⁶

W. MUSS-ARNOLT.

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SPINOZA'S GOTTESBEGRIFF. Von ELMER E. POWELL. Halle: Niemeyer, 1899. Pp. ix + 113. M. 3.

THE question as to whether God, in Spinoza's system, is a self-conscious intelligence, or a substance of which no such definite predicates can be affirmed, is one which still haunts the students of this fascinating and perplexing author. For the second view speak such statements as the denial of intellect and will to the divine being. For the first view speaks the fact that *cogitatio* is one of the divine attributes. The monograph of Dr. Powell is a study of the general outlines of Spinoza's system, and of the particular passages which bear upon this problem. He utilizes not only the *Ethics*, but the *Short Treatise*, which was not accessible to some of the earlier writers who have argued the question; and his conclusion, based to a considerable degree upon certain explicit statements in the *Short Treatise*, is in favor of the second alternative named above. In this I think he is right, in so far as the terms "self-conscious intelligence" are taken in any sense capable of interpretation in terms of human consciousness. At the same time, one feels that the Spinoza of the fifth book of the *Ethics*, if asked whether, in saying "God loves himself with an infinite love," he means merely that each man loves his fellow, would have replied: "No, I mean something far deeper than this, and something which mysticism has always striven to express, however inadequately. To be one with God is not merely to love my fellow-man,

⁵ Vol. II, p. 388, of this JOURNAL.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 391.

and to view the world *sub specie aeternitatis* is not merely a negative conception." In other words, although Spinoza's God, or Substance, or Nature, no doubt suffers from the logical prejudice that the universal must be indefinite, and although it may be more fittingly stated as substance than as subject, there was with Spinoza, as with other mystics, some positive value in this God with whom he would unite himself.

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A CRITICAL EXPOSITION OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF LEIBNIZ, with an Appendix of Leading Passages. By BERTRAND RUSSELL. Cambridge: The University Press; New York: Macmillan, 1900. Pp. ix + 311. \$2.25, net.

No ENGLISH work on the Leibnizian theory of knowledge has appeared since Gerhardt's edition of Leibniz presented its wealth of new material. There was, therefore, a demand for a new study in the light of this material. Mr. Russell has utilized especially the correspondence with Arnauld and the *Discours de metaphysique* of 1786 to present the system as following from Leibniz's view of propositions. This view was that all the possible predicates of a given subject are involved in that subject, so that a perfect knowledge of it would discover them. A substance, accordingly, has all its states contained within its essence or notion, and their emergence needs no action from without; each individual substance is a world apart. The metaphysics of the monadology follows, therefore, directly from a logic. Later chapters deal with Leibniz's view of substance and his arguments for the existence of God.

The general aim of the book is declared to be critical rather than historical. It is not so much to view the system of Leibniz in its historical relations or psychological development, as to examine its internal consistency and its objective tenability as a typical system. From this standpoint, Mr. Russell succeeds in finding much that is untenable and many arguments that in his opinion are "scandalous." It will probably occur to the reader, however, that in the case of Leibniz, more than in that of most, such a method and examination have comparatively little value. The system of Leibniz, as he himself says more than once, was a synthesis of varied tendencies and conceptions. It did not arise from a single logical deductive process, although its author did once state it from this point of view. The